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This paper represents the review of the author and does no
t 
necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of
 
The Air Force.
ABSTRACT
Military manned space systems have gone through a painfu
l 
evolution. A brief review is made of the history of such sys
­ 
tems, including the Dyna-soar and Manned Orbiting Labora
­ 
tory programs. The results of the Apollo program are dis
­ 
cussed. Recent high level policy declarations are reviewed
 
including a letter from the Air Force Chief of Staff and two
 
Presidential directives. Results of theoretical studies on the
 
utility of manned systems are reviewed, leading into a dis
­ 
cussion of manned military space missions that are eithe
r 
planned or being considered.
INTRODUCTION
The words Strategic Deterrence conjure visions of ICBMs on
 
alert for retaliation, or F-106s to counter bomber'attacks. I
t 
is easy to fall back on past experience and knowledge, and so
 
hard to look forward. The familiar is so comfortable, but in
 
today's rapidly changing environment perhaps we need to be
 
considering the unfamiliar as a path to establishing the strate
­ 
gic balance.
Adlai Stevenson told a story about how President Roosevel
t 
in 1937 wanted to get the best estimate of the scientific com
­ 
munity as to what was coming in the next decade, and a
s 
Stevenson describes the result, he found himself "on a pa
r 
with the greatest scientific minds of the time .... for I, too
, 
failed to foresee nuclear energy, antibiotics radar, the elec
­ 
tronic computer and rocketry".1 What is the lesson? It i
s 
that in the past, we have been too conservative in our projec
­ 
tions for the future. We demand more preciseness in describ
­ 
ing the threat upon which requirements for new systems can
 
be based. We are asked for detailed information on projected
 
system capabilities costs and schedules when in fact we can
 
only dimly perceive the shape of the future environment
. 
The well known, well published difficulties we are having in
 
developing a basing strategy for the MX is certainly a good
example of how hard it is to cope with the future, using
 
extensions of today's systems.
Perhaps we need to devote attention to more imaginative sys
­ 
tems of the future; systems that fly higher, faster, have globa
l 
range and that really extend man's military capabilities and
 
potential to react. Manned space system fit in that category
.
MANNED SPACE SYSTEMS BACKGROUND
It seems strange that there has been so much controversy
 
over manned space systems. You might argue that the
 
Dynasoar program was too far ahead of its time, that i
t 
pushed technology too much and that its payload capabili
­ 
ties and life cycle costs did not support continuing the pro
­ 
gram. You might also argue the same points for the Manned
 
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program. Those arguments are
 
moot, however, because we'll never know for sure what the
 
positive results of those programs might have been. Given the
 
rapid change in the balance of power today in hindsight we
 
may wish we had pursued such innovative programs more
 
vigorously.
When the MOL program was cancelled, it was felt the Apollo
 
program would demonstrate some of the utilities of man-in
- 
space that the military was interested in. However, it turned
 
out there few such objectivies or tests associated with Apollo
. 
Furthermore, there was no indepth study by the military o
f 
the results of Apollo until 1978, nine years after the Apollo
 
11 astronauts first stepped on the moon. Vietnam certainly
 
had us pre-occupied at that time, but I don't believe that i
s 
the main reason we were so uninterested in the lesson
s 
learned from Apollo. Characteristically, the military is very
 
conservative in nature and just as the Army was very un
­ 
interested in the airplane in 1910, so the corporate Air Force
 
has been relatively uninterested in space. But on a more
 
positive side, within the last 18 months things have started
 
to change.
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RECENT POLICY STATEMENTS
In May 1977, the Air Force Chief of Staff signed out a letter 
to all major commands entitled "Air Force Space Policy". It 
referred to our growing reliance on space operations which is 
accompanied by a growing threat to the free use of space.
The letter affirms that among prime Air Force responsibili­ 
ties are activities in space related to the development of 
weapons systems, military operations and the defense of the 
United States conducted in accordance with national policy 
and international law. The letter strongly supports the need 
for the Air Force to protect the free use of space by provid­ 
ing needed space defense capabilities.
This letter by the Chief represents the first formal declara­ 
tion of top Air Force policy on space in quite a long time. 
Not long after, there were two presidential directives publish­ 
ed that established U.S. policy on both civil and military 
space activities.2 They included the same thrusts of the 
Chief's letter and not unsurprisingly gave manned space 
systems such as the Shuttle and Spacelab strong support. For 
military Shuttle operations, the directive states, "The STS 
will service all authorized space users—domestic and foreign, 
commercial and governmental—and will provide launch 
priority and necessary security to national security missions 
while recognizing the essentially open character of the civil 
space program". These two directives cover a broad range of 
policies including space defense, satellite systems survivabil- 
ity, remote sensing, technology sharing and the convergence 
of military and civil space activities to name just a few. The 
directives merit close study by all of us.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MANNED SPACE 
PROGRAMS______________
The accomplishments of the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and 
Skylab programs are fairly well known, but let me provide 
just a brief summary as a reminder.
The first basic fact is that man is capable of operating effec­ 
tively in low earth orbit for extended periods of time. Based 
on the Skylab experience and th-e more recent Soviet accom­ 
plishments, we feel that manned orbital operations of up to 
six months should be no problem. We do need to understand 
the bone demineralization phenomena better before we can 
predict how long man may eventually work in a zero "G" 
environment. When talking about manned space operations 
at geosynchronous altitude, a period of 30 days seems to be 
"ballpark". I say "ballpark" because we still do not have the 
necessary data on the ionizing radiation environment in those 
orbits to make a more accurate judgement. The 30 day 
period is based on reasonable shielding approaches with the 
understanding that solar flares may call for bio-wells with 
wall thicknesses of one inch. Such flares can be predicted 
from 30 minutes to 12 hours ahead of time.
The second lesson is that man-on-the-scene lends tremen­
dously increased operational effectiveness to complicated 
and unforeseen tasks. When the Skylab solar telescope 
missions were being planned, we envisioned man as being on 
the scene only to throw the necessary switches as planned. 
This quickly became an obsolete mode of operation. You 
cannot effectively pre-plan an R&D or an operatinal mission 
when you are not sure of what you will see and when you 
will see it. The astronauts soon became experts at the identi­ 
fication of scientifically important phenomena. They cap­ 
tured valuable data during fleeting moments of opportunity 
and made many other on the spot judgments which enhanced 
the entire mission. Figure 1 shows a dramatic solar storm 
that was captured on film largely because an astronaut was 
on hand to recognize that something important was occur­ 
ring and to take appropriate action. The results of Skylab 
showed uneuqivocally the value of allowing highly trained 
crewmen to act independently on the basis of their observa­ 
tions of patterns, trends, and resultant extrapolations which 
are not possible with automated equipment. Other excel­ 
lent examples of astronaut capabilities include the complex 
repair of the coolant loop system on Skylab. On Apollo 13, 
the astronauts devised ingenious workarounds, which saved 
their lives and the" mission, after their spacecraft was dam­ 
aged by the rupture of a high pressure system. During the 
final descent phase to the moon, the on-board computer of 
the Apollo 11 Lunar Lander became overloaded. Manual 
override and control by the astronaut saved the mission 
which otherwise would have been aborted.
The Commander of the first Skylab mission repaired an 
inoperative power relay by rapping it with a hammer during a 
routine spacewalk. The manual deployment of the jammed 
solar panel on Skylab and the erection of the solar shade by 
Astronaut Pete Conrad saved that very important and ex­ 
pensive mission. Pete used a crowbar and deployed the solar 
array that was jammed, to use his words by "one lousy bolt". 
This is perhaps the best example of how man is indispensable 
in situations that on the surface appear quite simple but 
which no automated system can cope with.
Astronauts have also been exceptionally effective in rendez­ 
vous and docking. Their successes stand out in sharp contrast 
to the problems that the Soviets experienced in the past with 
their automated rendezvous and docking systems. Station 
keeping with another spacecraft and the alignment of inertial 
reference platforms are two other functions that crewmen 
on-the-scene have performed exceptionally well.
FUNCTIONAL SUPERIORITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF
MAN_______________________
Theoretical studies have been performed on man's superior 
functional performance compared to automated systems.3 
The results of these studies have had fairly limited distribu­ 
tion and understanding within the military. NASA on the 
other hand accepts almost as an article of faith that manned 
space capabilities are not only essential to the future eco­ 
nomic, social, and military well being of our nation, but in
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fact are almost mandatory. Let's look for a moment at the 
functional superiorities and limitations of man.
The human eye-mind combination is a wonderful synergism. 
What cannot be seen at first glance can be seen later by virtue 
of the mind integrating a series of incomplete or hazy visual 
images. Our forward air controllers in Vietnam would miss a 
target hidden under jungle foliage on the first pass, but after 
circling an area of interest, the sum of hundreds of images 
from different angles, aspects and lighting conditions would 
reveal the existence of a target that would have otherwise 
been missed. This same phenomena was identified by the 
astronauts and is key to our understanding of the values of 
man, on-the-scene, in space.
There are many limitations of the human eye which can be 
compensated for by the use of automated equipment. The 
image residence time of approximately 1/16 second limits 
our ability to distinguish rapid changes in a scene. A high 
speed camera can compensate for this. The eye is sensitive 
to a narrow band of frequencies bounded by the ultraviolet 
and infrared spectra; therefore, we employ systems that can 
detect those wave lengths. Even with its limitations, there are 
three ways in which the eye and eye/mind combination are 
superior:
DYNAMIC RANGE is a measure of the widest difference in 
feature brightness that can co-exist in a field of view without 
causing degraded preception of any feature. The eye is supe­ 
rior to all equipment and detectors that function in the 
visible spectrum in this respect. The astronauts found that 
their pictures from space looked washed out and did not 
record feature details of texture and hue that were so clearly 
evident to the unaided eye. In several cases, such as the 
Comet Kohoutek, items that were clearly visible to the eye 
did not show up in the picture.
Man excels at PATTERN RECOGNITION. The human 
observer possesses extraordinary talent to recognize patterns 
or configurations that correlate with the familiar or contrast 
with the norm. It is nearly impossible to incorporate active, 
real time pattern discrimination in the design of automated 
equipment.
Man alscf excels at TEXTURE IDENTIFICATION. The eye 
is not perfect in making textural distinctions but is far supe­ 
rior to any automated equipment in differentiating between 
ice, snow, and clouds for example.
These next two figures summarize all of the functions that 
man does well, either by himself or in combination with 
other systems.4 The bottom line is that there are many such 
functions that cannot be automated. The human eye-brain- 
hand system is by far the most flexible and versatile data 
analysis and servo system ever launched into space. It gives 
us an ad hoc response capability wherein we can detect, 
interpret and react in real time to unprogrammed events or 
opportunities. This is an important consideration.
I know that these two figures are very busy and they are 
included only to make the point that there are a great 
number of diverse functions, all of which we take for granted, 
that man does exceedingly well, which either cannot be auto­ 
mated or which would cost much more to automate. A short­ 
er list of those which I believe are the more important func­ 
tions include: aligning, analyzing, assembling, deploying, 
devising workarounds, docking, prioritizing, experimenting, 
analyzing malfunctions and repairing, inspecting, launching 
and recovering, maneuvering, monitoring, recovering pay- 
loads and replacing parts. In sum, what can be done by man 
comprises a long list and all of the permutations and com­ 
binations of these functions probably approach infinity. That 
is one reason we have so much trouble addressing the subject.
MANNED MILITARY SPACE MISSIONS
What military missions can be enhanced, or more impor­ 
tantly, enabled by man-in-space? From the past discussion 
some of these missions will be obvious and other less so. 
Let's start with the most straightforward ones.
In space transportation, the man-in-the-loop allows the sys­ 
tem to be recovered and reused. This has a large cost benefit. 
With man, payloads can be deployed, checked out and, if 
required, returned to the launch site. We can also deploy 
such satellites as the Long Duration Exposure Facility where­ 
in experiments are exposed to the Space environment for 
extended periods of time, measured in years and then re­ 
covered for analysis. Likewise satellites that have failed in 
orbit can be recovered for detailed failure analysis. These 
are all significant new capabilities and the few I have men­ 
tioned are just the tip of the iceberg.
Military R&D is an area which man in space may well re­ 
volutionize. Let me cite a few potential examples. We can­ 
not derive as accurate trajectory information or impact 
prediction data as desired from our ICBM warning satellites. 
There is the possibility that the signal-to-noise ratio of an 
ultraviolet (UV) sensor sensing missile plumes during space- 
flight would allow improved detection and tracking. The 
earth essentially looks black to a UV sensor in space. How­ 
ever, we have not been able to get the necessary ultraviolet 
plume signature data from space using automated systems. 
We think that a manned system, perhaps Spacelab, using 
essentially off-the-shelf hardware may well be able to coordi­ 
nate operations such that a man could identify a launch, 
point the systems, lock on, ajdust the field of view to maxi­ 
mize the value of observed data, test and select various 
filters, operate other sensors in parallel for data correlation, 
annotate the data, etc., in such a way that for the first time, 
good UV plume signature data may be acquired in minimum 
time and at minimum cost. It turns out that the astronauts 
of Gemini Five and Seven demonstrated pointing and track­ 
ing using small IR systems and got good data on Minuteman 
III and Polaris launches, and they tracked a ground sled 
launch as well as the plume for a reentry vehicle.5 So you
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can see that we are not talking about anything very radical or 
new.
Experience shows we seldom set out to solve a specific pro­ 
blem in a laboratory and end up with the point solution. 
Rather, the scientist experiments, observes certain phenom­ 
ena which leads him down new paths to new important and 
not necessarily unrelated discoveries. We need to provide our 
scientists that capability in space. This is admittedly high risk 
technology but with a very high potential payoff. The acqui­ 
sition of a space lab to perform experimentation that could 
benefit various mission areas may be warranted and deserves 
consideration.
We think that man can contribute greatly to space test efforts 
jn addition to the data and phenomenology activities already 
mentioned. In general, it appears that if you stay with the 
approach of using an automated spacecraft it takes up to six 
years to design, develop, and test-in-space the first proof of 
concept system. With a manned approach you could con­ 
ceivably launch a brassboard model in about two years or 
less, an engineering development model in a year later and a 
system prototype in another year.6 In sum, we have the 
potential for schedule compression, lower overall costs, and 
three tests instead of one, which benefit from a learning 
curve and more reliable and meaningful data.
SUMMARY
The United States has always been-known as the leader in 
technology. We all are aware that today we are losing that 
edge to the Japanese, Germans, and other innovative friendly 
and unfriendly competitors. Due to budget realities, we have 
to rely on quality rather than quantity in our armaments.
The Apollo program is given extremely high marks for 
improving our nation's overall technology which bolstered 
our economy and improved our military. The Space Shuttle 
is the next step in the right direction.
As discussed there are several valuable experiments that 
could be accomplished by military crews in space. There are 
many more that could be discussed that are classified.
Our deterrence is based upon our power. An old quote says 
that, "Before it is used, power is what people think it is". 
Therefore, our power has to be credible in that the Soviets 
have to believe we'would use it, if provoked. Space systems 
provide a great deal of the communications and information 
required to "use" our power.
No one knew that Colombus, Lewis and Clark or the Wright 
Brothers would achieve before their successes, and they cer­ 
tainly had their critics. So today we are still a little unsure of 
what manned space systems will bring. We can say, however, 
that everytime man explored the unknown, or travelled 
higher and faster it has turned out to be very beneficial to 
that particular society.
I predict that manned space systems will provide at least the 
same quantum jump in military capabilities as did the air­ 
plane. We must not take as long to embrace space as it took 
to exploit air.
In summary, it is most important to maintain an excellent 
technology base, especially in the new regime of space, so 
that we can be flexible and responsive to any emerging 
requirement or threat. For as General Van Moltke said, "you 
will usually find that the enemy has three courses of action 
open to him. Of these, he will pick the fourth."
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